![]() ![]() ![]() Pki -gen -type ecdsa -size 384 -outform pem > cakey.pem There are subtle differences, we give different usage permissions to each certificate type, so please ensure you follow and paste each command below in exact order, substituting your own values in fields. It is important to note the different commands for creating the CA, Host and Client certificates. The following commands will need to be done by you via SSH to your IPFire appliance: ![]() We will need to manually create ECP384 (ECDSA) certificates instead, to use with our hardened Windows 10 clients. This is because when using ECP384 for the VPN, Windows requires the host certificate and client certificate to also be using ECP384.īy default, IPFire is creating an RSA4096 CA (Root) certificate, and a RSA 2048 host certificate for IPsec. Now try and connect the VPN, you will get an error about the IKE machine certificate being invalid. If you do not fall into those categories, I’d suggest you stick with 128. You can substitute GCMAES128 with GCMAES256 if you are one of those people that must 256bit key all the things, or are dealing with Government compliance surrounding the transmission of Top Secret data. > -AuthenticationTransformConstants GCMAES128 ` On your Windows 10 client, open PowerShell and type the following: Set-VpnConnectionIPsecConfiguration -Name "" ` Now we are going to deliberately break things. Through the process, once you connect a Windows 10 device to your IPsec VPN, you will want to SSH into your IPFire appliance and use cat /var/log/messages to see entries from charon regarding what ciphers are being selected. Go ahead and use this wiki article to set up a working config for your Windows devices to connect to your IPFire appliance. But still some risk remains, if they precompute some bad packets I guess it could be possible, and we can do better, so we should. Doing integrity checking of data with SHA1 (HMAC-SHA1 in fact) is less bad, because by the time an attacker can generate a collision, we’re already onto new packets and new hashes. Comparing password hashes or certificate/file fingerprints using SHA1 is bad. It should be said that whilst SHA1 is considered weak, this is mostly from an auth context. IPFire in fact tells you that the modp-1024 used by default in a Windows 10 connection is considered broken.īy default Windows 10 wants to use AES256-CBC/SHA1/MODP-1024 and really none of these are fantastic for the task. Having setup IPsec roadwarrior IPFire - Windows 10 recently, I noticed that the ciphers chosen in Windows 10 were quite bad. ** WARNING THIS WILL BREAK ALL EXISTING IPSEC CONNECTIONS, YOU WILL NEED TO MAKE NEW CERTIFICATES FOR EXISTING CONNECTIONS ** ![]()
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